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Accountability in the provision of urban services
S. Cavill and M. Sohail
This paper assesses the potential of accountability
arrangements to improve the quality of local services as
well as the responsiveness of services providers to the
needs of users and in particular those of the poor. In the
first section of this paper municipal services are
embedded in a social and political context, before moving
on to explore a broad set of contemporary innovations in
the way services are delivered. The research on which this
paper is based was undertaken in cities and so specific
attention is paid to urban areas. Accountability is defined
using the existing literature and the current models for
accountability are presented. In the second part of the
paper research from case studies in South Africa, Bangla-
desh and the UK are presented. These studies reveal that
while the provision of urban services is often based on
ethicsthat is, that no one should be disadvantaged by
where they live (in the UK) or that everyone should have
access to services such as water, sanitation, and electricity
(in South Africa)ethics alone are not enough to ensure
adequate urban services. Accountability is most effective
when these ethics are translated into more tangible rights
or guarantees of performance, which enable ethics to be
realised. Increasingly, however, accountability is used to
better manage services and their users and has been
reduced to a set of technical tools and procedural mea-
sures which can be universally applied. Consequently,
ethics do not necessarily function as an input to systems
of accountability. In conclusion, it is recognised that
accountability cannot be reduced to a technocratic,
politics-free management tool but are a product of a
particular socio-cultural context.
‘It is not that we should simply seek new and better ways for
managing society, the economy, and the world. The point is that we
should fundamentally change how we behave.’1
‘If public bureaucracies are to serve citizens well, they must be made
accountable not only for the services they render, but also for the
quality and manner in which those services are delivered.’2
‘We shouldn’t point a finger at any one individual. I have a friend in
the department; we are talking about the system and not my friends.
If the system is made better people will improve’ (respondent from
Dhaka from author’s own fieldwork).
1. INTRODUCTION
Ethics are explored in this paper in the context of account-
ability for urban services. The overall aim of the paper is to
assess the role of ethics and accountabilities in the provision of
urban services. Other objectives are to
(a) consider contemporary innovations in the way municipal
services are delivered
(b) define accountability using the existing literature and
present current models for accountability
(c) discuss how ethical responsibilities can be operationalised
in the context of civil engineering
(d ) provide an understanding of ethics as a product of the
socio-political context
(e) review the function of ethics as an input to systems of
accountability
( f ) present initial findings from case studies undertaken in
South Africa, Bangladesh and the UK
(g) examine the potential of accountability arrangements
demonstrated in these case studies to improve the quality
of local services and the responsiveness of services
providers.
The term ‘urban services’ refers to water and sanitation, street
cleaning, solid waste management, roads and street lighting.
Some of these services are procured under sets of regulations
and may involve the use of market forces. Procurement is the
process of buying the goods, works or services, which in our
case comprise local infrastructure in urban neighbourhoods.
The main goals of urban services normally include improving
quality of life, as well as the economic, environmental,
governance and financial context of service provision.2 Access
to urban services has social, physical and economic dimensions,
reflecting competing claims over scarce resources and power
relations. While low-income people are likely to benefit most
from public urban services, because they are least likely to
obtain acceptable alternatives, it is often the case that higher-
income groups in society tend to secure better services.
Sattherwaite3–5 draws a distinction between what he calls
’income poverty’ and ’housing poverty’ to represent the
difference between households with a below poverty line
income but who have access to a free government school and
health care, secure tenure, piped water and adequate provision
for sanitation and drainage; and households without these
entitlements who are clearly more vulnerable. The politics
surrounding the provision of infrastructure frequently reinforce
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the inequities in society such as social relations of power like
class, status, race, ethnicity, age and culture.6,7 Stephens8 is
concerned with the process by which people are made
vulnerable by other people. She makes the distinction between
inequality and inequity. Inequalities in access to services may
lead to health inequalities. However, if one group (usually the
wealthy) benefits at the expense of another group (usually the
poor), this is a health inequity. Furthermore, Ubels (cited on p.
198 of Reference 11) argues that infrastructure ‘is a basis for
social interaction’, thus the physical state of the service must in
some way reflect the quality of interaction between service
providers and users. Such analysis explicitly questions the
neutrality of urban service provision, based on objective criteria
such as need, demand, efficiency, and resources. The discretion
afforded to workers in direct contact with the public may result
in less predictable outcomes. The implementation of account-
ability arrangements is aimed at transforming the relationship
between service providers and citizens, resulting in an increase
of trust and reciprocity. Increasing accountability to users for
urban services is thought to enable public monitoring of service
performance and quality of work, better targeting and alloca-
tion of resources and operation of services that better reflect
local needs.
2. CHANGING PROVIDERS OFURBAN SERVICES
Public provision of urban services has been critiqued on the
basis of waste of resources, lack of operation and maintenance,
poor management, corruption, inefficiency, rent seeking and
unaccountability, leading to inadequate services. Proponents of
this view have advocated reforms of the public sector, increased
private participation in service delivery, as well as the
involvement of users in order to improve service delivery. The
implication of this has been to fragment service delivery.
Attempts to ensure quality outcomes of service delivery have
resulted in an emphasis on charters, performance targets,
benchmarks and consumer rights as well as the promotion of a
direct relationship between service providers and users of urban
services. It is generally accepted that it is much easier to
achieve accountable urban services when users have face-to-
face contact or a personal relationship with the service
provider.9,10 Where this is not possible, accountability arrange-
ments, as a proxy for personal ethics, are instigated. Account-
ability arrangements can then be seen to obviate the need for
ethics.
3. ACCOUNTABILITY FORURBANSERVICES
Accountability is composed of answerability (providing an
account for actions undertaken) and enforceability (punishment
for poor performance).13 Accountability has political, financial,
administrative, legal and constitutional aspects as well as
spatial dimensions. Horizontal accountability entails institu-
tional checks and balances for holding service providers
accountable to users. Citizens have also been involved directly
in the workings of horizontal accountability institutions, for
example participatory auditing of public spending. Goetz and
Gaventa12 call this ’diagonal accountability’. The main institu-
tions involved in promoting vertical accountability are legal
frameworks, judiciary and accounting systems, consultations
with civil society, elected representatives, and media. Vertical
accountability depends on awareness of rights and the will-
ingness and ability to defend them, clarity about the procedures
(for example, in procurement) and regulations for redress.
Answerability of service providers is both upward to central
government and downward to services users and is to be
demonstrated by carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed
performance standards including financial accountability, effi-
ciency in use of resources, effectiveness in meeting goals,
consultation with stakeholders, and so on. Paul13,14 presents a
model of accountability for urban services which focuses on
users’ micro-level decision making in terms of exit (finding an
alternative service), voice (complaining about the quality of
service) and loyalty (hoping things will get better); Paul is
suggesting that the general welfare of users and quality of
services can best be achieved by individuals pursuing their own
interests. More and more, service users are encouraged to
become ‘the active makers and shapers of services, exercising
their preferences as consumers and their rights as citizens’,15
converting what are essentially public problems into personal
troubles. Castells16 thought a failing urban service is potentially
a source of radical social change. However, the poor are not
typically ‘competent consumers’, lacking the financial and
political resources or technical expertise to mobilise effectively.
This points to the potential for less equity in service provision,
favouring those who are better at individualistic bargaining for
better services. Accountability arrangements may then just be
papering over the cracks of the structural causes of poor
services.
4. WHOSE ETHICS; WHOSE ACCOUNTABILITY?
Ethics can be understood to be either a product of the socio-
political context (such as the religion, culture or ethnic identity;
family values; personal experience; peer groups or personal
conscience; standards and values) or viewed as a quality innate
to being human and so universally shared. Ethical responsi-
bilities in the context of civil engineering can be operationa-
lised in terms of not engaging or continuing action that
increases injustice, the unequal treatment of persons or
increasing the unfair distribution of resources. Ethical behav-
iour might arise from self-interest (for example the fear of
punishment, the desire for rewards or for approval from
superiors); alternatively ethics may be a consequence of the
mandatory adherence to the standards, norms or laws of society
or one’s profession (such as professional codes, company codes,
regulatory requirements), or ethical behaviour may arise from a
utilitarian desire for fairness and social justice. In this instance,
ethics as an internal moral code is subtly different from
accountability, which is principally an obligation to others and
where one’s behaviour is regulated by others not self. An
illustration of the difference between ethics and accountability
in service delivery is found in the provision of urban services in
illegal settlements in Bangladesh and South Africa. When
interviewed, local government justified withholding municipal
services from slum areas of Dhaka by labelling the poor as
prostitutes, drug dealers or pimps; this is a value judgement. In
South African slums, on the other hand, government provides
services such as water, concerned with a rights-based and more
politicised approach to service provision.
The ethics, attitudes and values that are currently said to
encourage high standards of service delivery are typically
associated with the private sector, for example amoral market
mechanisms, efficiency, economy and effectiveness, the profit
motive, material rewards and incentives to do a good job;
whereas the public sector is typically associated with moral
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appeals to solidarity, mutual responsibility, public sector ethos
and loyalty. Yet for Chambers (cited on p. 118 of Reference 18)
individual personal change is the key to ethical service
delivery, for example ‘personal commitments, which seek to
serve those who are weaker and more deprived’. Brown,
however (cited in pp. 148–149 of Reference 18) claims this
stance is to the detriment of political analysis; ‘in which
questions of power and authority are treated as largely
subordinate to individual values and attitudes’, which may risk
a situation in which rights become contingent on certain values
and attitudes.
The current emphasis on accountability as a means to ensure
improved services embodies a new universal prescription in
service provision, often adopted in developing countries
through donor leverage. It might be expected that there is a
linear relationship between increasing accountability and better
services. However, Lipsky (cited in Reference 19) finds that the
responsiveness of street-level bureaucrats to clients necessarily
entails that they are less controllable by the agencies for which
they work. Such controls, he argues, would reduce the quality
of the service and increase the costs. Day and Klein (on pp.
231–232 of Reference 10) suggest that holding providers
accountable for the performance of a service is difficult because
of the variety of actors involved in service provision and the
problematic relationship between inputs, outcomes and the
wider social environment. Furthermore, they question whether
service users are the best judge of the performance of
professionals and experts.
The outcomes of accountability arrangements can be proble-
matised in three main ways.
(a) Accountability arrangements aim to develop trust in the
activities of service providers. As such ‘they presuppose a
culture of mistrust in professions and institutions that they
themselves contribute to, produce and intensify’.20 Para-
doxically, mechanisms to publicly increase transparency in
service delivery may result in decreasing public visibility;
‘accountability becomes reduced to meeting of pre-stated
performance targets, and that activity is manipulated to
show that these have been met’.23
(b) Accountability arrange-
ments are portrayed as
essentially a neutral and
technical exercise but
can be exercised in a
discretionary and discri-
minatory way with dif-
ferent standards for
different actors; ‘who
defines accountability,
for whom and why, are
questions which need to
be analysed very care-
fully’ (Karim quoted in
Reference 22).
(c) Accountability arrange-
ments can be used to
better manage the service
providers’ relationship
with users. In effect,
accountability arrangements narrow the scope for action
when services fail, legitimising only certain strategies;
complaints then become emasculated by the institutionali-
sation and domestification of dissent.23
5. METHODOLOGY
The case studies presented below are based on information
collected using the case study methodology; field visits, semi-
structured interviews, questionnaires, secondary documents and
direct observation of events including service provision. The
data were collected from July 2002 to July 2003. A short case
summary based on an initial data analysis from Bristol, UK and
Mdantsane, South Africa and Dhaka, Bangladesh is presented.
5.1. UK
Project Pathfinder was launched in Barton Hill in 1999 to
produce an integrated and more locally responsive solution to
the delivery of waste collection, street cleaning, grounds
maintenance, household bulky collections, gully emptying and
recycling services at the neighbourhood level. It involves a
partnership between the public sector (Bristol City Council’s
Neighbourhood and Housing Service), private sector (SITA GB
Ltd), a non-governmental organisation (NGO), (ResourceSaver
Ltd which operates the kerbside ’black box’ recycling collection
service in Bristol under a subcontract) and Community at Heart
(a resident-led charity established to deliver the £50 million
New Deal for Communities programme in Barton Hill, Redfield,
Lawrence Hill and the Dings). The project also meets the new
UK government policy, Targeting Social Need, aimed at
tackling inequalities in service provision and promoting social
inclusion, whereby resources and efforts are targeted to those in
greatest need (www.newtsnni.gov.uk). Project Pathfinder is
gaining national recognition for its innovative approach to
neighbourhood street management and democratic, accounta-
ble service delivery. The key features of the project are detailed
in the subsections below and summarised in Table 1.
5.1.1. Accountability arrangements. Accountability was chan-
ged by both opportunities to make requests or complaints in
formal meetings with services providers as well as informal,
face-to-face meetings with the team in the streets or in the
local one-stop shop, together with the traditional channels for
Sector Ethics
Local government . Working in partnerships with communities
. Innovative solutions to failing services
. Increasing the sustainability of waste management
. Seeking greater justice and dignity for those denied it
Central government . New Deal for Communities and Social Exclusion Unit; no one
should be disadvantaged by where they live
. Search for Best Value from contractors
. Election promises to improve public services
. Giving citizens greater voice in local affairs
. Promotion of self-reliance, reduced dependence on government
Private sector . Providing Best Value for contract price
. Profit motive
Voluntary sector . Increasing the sustainability of waste management
Users . Political accountability of local councillor for services
Table 1. Key features of Project Pathfinder
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complaints/requests at Bristol City Council. The project has
created a new level of accountability; residents can exert direct
pressure on services providers, through useful encounters, ad
hoc face-to-face personal contact, as well as the traditional
monitoring from the client officer of the local authority, and
intervention of the local councillor. Any pressure to adopt more
formalised or professional structures of accountability may
reduce this micro-level participation.
5.1.2. User involvement in service provision. Users had the
potential for significant involvement in the planning as well as
management of services, but attempts to involve residents in
advisory meetings failed due to lack of interest. The project also
increased residents’ access to information and created space for
the voices of consumers to be heard.
5.1.3. Improvements in services quality. Project Pathfinder has
increased the effectiveness and efficiency of waste collection in
Barton Hill as well as creating a sense of community ownership
of the local environment. Staff take the time to listen, and
respond in a more coherent way.
5.1.4. Improved access. Establishment of a one-stop shop for
local residents means they can pop in or phone if they have a
problem; the Pathfinder team can also be contacted on their
mobile phones. The local one-stop shop gave residents
significantly improved access to service providers, shortened
lines of communication and accountability, reduced social
barriers to access, and provided support for people with literacy
difficulties, all of which helped raise awareness of new locally
integrated services.
5.1.5. Improved accountability in functioning. There is a
recognition of users as partners in service delivery. Efforts have
been made to increase user awareness of their rights to access
good-quality services in an equitable and accountable way.
However, there is also a need for sufficient resources and
support for improvements in services.
5.1.6. Staff conditions. The work has become more interesting,
meaningful and satisfying and staff have been freer to manage
their work plans. They make better use of their skills and take
pride in their work and achievements; as such they have
achieved higher productivity and standards of refuse collection
than the other crews in the city. Demands on staff increased
due to closer and more extensive contact with consumers,
which meant sustained pressure to improve services, in addition
to the high profile of the project for its innovative approach to
waste management.
5.1.7. Unanticipated effects. The crew are described as ‘the eyes
and ears of our community’; they act as informal community
wardens, reporting abandoned cars, crime, damaged lampposts,
tackling security issues, and have become a source of local
information and advice on other services such as welfare and
have had a direct influence on antisocial behaviour such as
vandalism and drug dealing in the area.
5.2. South Africa
Ethical and fair service delivery is one of the hallmarks of post-
apartheid South Africa, where previously services were expli-
citly organised around apartheid imperatives. The Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa (1996) grants all citizens an
equal and inalienable right to housing, health care, water and
social security. South Africans have two key mechanisms for
improving the responsiveness and performance of service
providers: popular participation in government through direct
and representative methods as well as a more results-based and
client-orientated public services, under the Batho Pele (People
First) programme.
Ward committees have become the preferred way of involving
communities in municipal affairs. A ward committee is a
specialised participatory structure, composed of ten members
and designed to be a communication channel between the
community and ward councillor, reporting council business and
municipal performance to communities and feeding back
community needs to council. Ward committees act as advisory
bodies on policies affecting the wards as well as providing a
mechanism for community participation in monitoring, meas-
uring and reviewing municipal performance. The ward com-
mittee can also ensure their ward councillor accounts for his/
her actions, for the decisions taken and the promises made. The
ward committees are designed to account for the special needs
of previously disadvantaged groups. Ward committees are
intended to be a grassroots organisation closer to residents than
the local government rather than another tier of bureaucracy;
however, this may result in indistinct lines of accountability
between elected leadership and members of civil society
working in a voluntary capacity in functions that are
essentially consultative and advisory.
The following observations of accountability arrangements
working in practice are based on a study of a suburb of East
London called Mdantsane, which under apartheid was devel-
oped as a dormitory town in the former Ciskei, politically and
administratively separate from East London and was incorpo-
rated into the city in 1997. Service provision in Mdantsane
ranges from household connections for water and sewerage and
tarmac roads to pit latrines and standpipes. Table 2 gives a
summary.
5.2.1. Accountability arrangements. Service delivery must be
transparent, open and accountable in line with Section 195 of
the constitution. In addition, new rights to services have been
set out by which the government can be held accountable by
citizens. The Reconstruction and Development Programme
standards for services delivery also give people a voice in their
local government and a role in setting priorities for develop-
ment planning. Batho Pele, a government campaign to improve
customer service, states that there should be consultation with
citizens about the level and quality of services they receive. The
integrated development plan (IDP) is the principal strategic
planning tool and by law under the Municipal Systems Act
(2000) requires democratic accountability through community
participation in strategic decisions relating to the provision of
municipal services and monitoring their performance in order
to improve the level, quality and effectiveness of services. The
focus of the IDP is on expressed needs and community
aspirations and provides a more effective way of managing
resources. Central government also requires that a municipality
establish a performance management system, with provision of
infrastructures as key performance areas and recommends that
communities should be involved in the setting of key perform-
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ance indicators. The IDP process and performance management
systems are intended to reform service delivery at the
municipality level; to ensure sustainable, equitable, efficient,
effective and affordable services. In theory, municipalities are
to be held accountable for meeting IDP targets and performance
indicators. Other activities specific to East London are The
Mayor’s Listening Campaign, The Quality of Life Survey as
well as newspaper articles, media broadcasts, and public
meetings.
5.2.2. User involvement in service provision. The ward com-
mittees are heavily involved in planning and setting standards
for service provision in their wards. The impact is variable and
not possible to evaluate fully as they have been operating for
such a short time. However, a weak civil society within wards
may mean councillors have not been made to account as
elected representatives by their constituencies. Furthermore,
user involvement is dependent on ward committee members
sharing power. Provincial and central government have made
provisions for more regular opinion surveys, more consumer
education. The Municipal Systems Bill (1999) is focused on
the rights and duties of residents and communities and makes
the link between rights and duties, Masakhane and payments
for services, residents’ responsibility in matters of local
municipality with special reference to attendance of council
meetings, and involvement and participation in decision
making.
5.2.3. Improvements in service quality. The Municipal Systems
Act (2000) set out the need for a system for monitoring efforts
to address service delivery backlogs, quantify development
needs and prioritise development initiatives through IDP.
Monitoring is achieved by establishing a performance manage-
ment system based on indicators. This scheme is in line with
national requirements that require local government to move
towards indicators based systems of performance assessment.
The increased voice of consumers is expected to lead to
further improvements in due course. However, more signifi-
cant improvements depend on larger budget allocations to
operation and maintenance of services, improved training
and management, capacity, IT and service performance
targets.
5.2.4. New rights. All South Africans must have access to
water, sanitation, electricity, rubbish removal and other services
by way of a lifeline amount of basic services based on the
principle of cross-subsidisation. While physical access has
greatly increased, coverage is not universal. There have been
various campaigns to increase service efficiency at a national
and provincial level.
5.2.5. Improved access. Municipalities are expected to be
developmental as stated in the Local Government White Paper,
and is responsible for the implementation of the lifeline tariff.
Local government has the option of making use of the private
sector to increase access by the poor to essential services,
provided they can effectively deliver services at substantially
higher levels of quality, cost and coverage than alternative
providers. This means decentralised service provider offices
along with improved mechanisms for personal, written and
Sector Ethics
Local government . User-orientated public services
. Improves access to services
. Managing citizens to curb their frustrations
. Sense of responsibility for ensuring that services reach the poor
. Improve democracy and community empowerment
. Improve community control and responsiveness
. Market-oriented and commercial viewcost-effective services, better value for money
Central government . Social upliftment of the previously disadvantaged
. Political imperatives to be accountable to the majority
. Defined rights for certain services for the poor
. Seek greater justice and greater dignity for those denied it
. Creation of a more equitable society; equality of opportunity and access creates social justice,
expression of social solidarity
. Ideological concerns with reducing bureaucratic discretion/public management
Private sector . Consumer-orientated model of accountabilitythat is, through competition and payment for services
Voluntary sector . Watchdog role in case local government fails to serve the poor
. Ensure that the poor have the resources and political space to seek accountability from governments
and service providers
. Empowering the poor to act
. Promote a rights-based framework to service delivery, not contingent on goodwill of individual service
providers
Users . High expectations of ethical behaviour from service providers and government among those
disadvantaged by apartheid
. Withholding payment until services meet expectations in terms of quality and cost
. Community solidarity; sense that no one should be withoutfor example if a household’s water supply
is cut off for non-payment, the household can access water from neighbours
. New rights to services
. Lifeline tariff for water (6000 litres of waterhousehold/month based on eight sharing a household) and
electricity supply (50 kWh)
Table 2. Key features of South African programmes
Municipal Engineer 156 Issue ME4 Ethics and accountability Cavill  Sohail 239
telephone contact in case of complaint; increased access to
local government and service providers through local ward
committee members.
5.2.6. Improved accountability in functioning. South Africa is
characterised by organised civil society. The new democracy
emphasises accountability and responsiveness to the excluded.
Users tend to be aware of their rights to be involved in service
delivery and to access good-quality services. There is debate in
civil society about the policy of the cost recovery basis for
service delivery and enforcing cut-offs for non-payment of
bills. There is a changing relationship between providers and
users: central government is now trying to change the strategy
of non-payment for services used during apartheid; now there
are attempts to channel user complaints through the mechan-
isms of local democracy such as ward committees with
attention to involving minorities who have less influence in
decision making.
5.2.7. Information dissemination. Ward committees are an
instrument for monitoring the performance of their local
authorities while at the same time holding their councillors
accountable; they are also used to encourage community
participation in the shaping and development of IDP, thus
information about services has improved. Local municipal
offices can handle all aspects of work, and telephone reporting
has greatly enhanced access for service users; ward committees
and the ward councillor act as advocates, representing gains in
social accessibility.
5.2.8. Staff working conditions. The content of work and the
performance standards expected became more exacting, so that
jobs became more arduous. There was limited recognition of
this by local government or of the difficulty of working closer
to the consumers without adequate training and equipment,
management or remuneration to balance increased responsi-
bilities and pressure.
5.2.9. Unintended impacts. The influence of users over service
managers has grown, but there is a danger that they will be co-
opted by the ward committee system rather than challenging
local government. Ward committee members, however, report
feeling threatened by residents, sometimes because of their
political affiliations but also reflecting the frustration with the
slow pace of change and delivery of services. Consultation with
users has made life more difficult for staff as they have
struggled to adapt to more knowledgeable and powerful users.
These initiatives have occurred in a context of limited
resources—that is, finances, skills, technical and personnel to
assist local authorities. Local authorities have been unable to
provide the requisite information to ensure realistic budgeting
and often lack the capacity to plan effectively.
5.3. Bangladesh
Getting connections to services (water, sewerage, electricity)
takes time. It is usually quicker to circumvent the system
through unofficial payments; these may be asked for by
officials or paid by users in anticipation of problems with
officials. Even when a connection is received, the supply
remains unpredictable, users complain of regular power
outages, low water pressure, and infrequent garbage collection.
Resolving problems usually necessitates further under-the-table
payments. Dhaka City Corporation has a grievance redressal
system for complaints about its services; however, only a small
proportion of households are aware of it or bother to use formal
mechanisms because citizens generally feel that there will be no
follow-up to their complaint. Officials are often not available or
indifferent and uncooperative in providing assistance; alterna-
tively citizens get passed from one official to another because
staff lack proper information on services, or are unaware of
rules and procedures. Dealings between service providers and
users are not always direct; sometimes users may be required to
go through influential intermediaries (middlemen, political
leaders, influential persons, friends and neighbours) to accel-
erate access. These intermediaries may be mastaans (muscle
men) who facilitate ‘illegal’ connections to essential services
such as electricity and water and in turn pay bribes to officials
to stay in business.24
Attempts to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of urban
service delivery in Dhaka have included calls for reforming the
role of state and instituting a system of accountability that
makes service providers answerable to service consumers. None
of the utilities guarantees a minimum quality or level of service
or measure user satisfaction. A further feature of service
delivery in Dhaka is increasing partnerships with profit and
non-profit service providers. However, the involvement of the
private sector may ‘mirror and reproduce social patterns of
discrimination and exclusion, affecting the capacity of different
poverty groups to gain access to resources and to realise
entitlements’.25 Table 3 gives a summary.
5.3.1. Accountability arrangements. There is a general resigna-
tion to corruption in service delivery by service users and
providers. It is regarded as a kind of necessary evil; corrupt
practices ranged in scale from bribes between customers and
ground-level workers or using influential contacts to pressure
front-line workers to do repair work quickly, expedite the
approval of new connections, for meter readers to record a
reduced level of water consumption, and at the other end of the
scale corruption in construction contracts and procurement.
There are some consumer opinion surveys, usually conducted
by NGOs, but otherwise consumers have little formal influence
on utilities; public reactions expressed through the newspapers
may cause temporary modifications to service delivery. Lodging
complaints is a trade-off between paying cash for speedy
resolution or paying with time and effort needed to resolve a
problem. However, service providers are accountable to those
who can pay bribes as well as powerful or influential service
users; this scenario can work to the benefit of the poor if they
can secure access to a patron or local politician. Political
accountability typically rests on the premise that the citizens of
Dhaka elected them, after which citizens have no easy
mechanism to make them take their interests into account.
Accountability for urban services is typically confused; Dhaka
City Corporation is taken to task by the press and public for
inadequate services, even when these do not fall within its
functional jurisdiction.
5.3.2. User involvement in service provision. In the day-to-day
operations of Dhaka City Corporation/Dhaka Water And
Sewerage Authority consumers have little influence; informa-
tion and participation are not an objective of service delivery.
Service providers lack the resources to enable user involvement
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and service users reported a lack of the technical and financial
knowledge for effective monitoring of service delivery, not only
among residents with low levels of education but also among
more educated residents. Politicians and local e´lites influence
service delivery in their areas as a vote-winning strategy. User
involvement in service delivery is typically linked to NGOs;
Dhaka City Corporation abdicated some responsibilities for
service provision because it could not afford to provide quality,
coverage, and sustainable services. Waste Concern, a Dhaka-
based NGO, initiated a small-scale, community-based organic
waste recycling project. Household waste is collected door-to-
door in predominately middle-class areas that are dissatisfied
with Dhaka City Corporation’s service. The majority of NGOs,
however, that are involved in service delivery in Dhaka are
serving the urban poor. The strategy of the poor has been one
of exit from municipal supply whereby NGOs have been
undertaking public service functions. However, the feedback
mechanism is missing, as exit has not increased the political
cost of inadequate services or induced increased competence in
municipal service delivery. In fact, exit from municipal supply
by the poor has in effect endorsed the privilege of certain
people in service delivery. This is in part because the poor lack
the organisational strength for a sustained dialogue with Dhaka
City Corporation; for example, voice is typically demonstrated
by protest marches.
5.3.3. Improvements in service quality. Service quality can be
characterised as slow, unreliable, unresponsive, inflexible with
essentially bureaucratic and centralised rules and procedures
and pervasive corruption. The relationship between Dhaka City
Corporation and NGOs has led to dramatic improvements for
slum dwellers, including a reduction in the power differentials
that normally characterise the relationship between slum
dwellers and service providers; for example, access to a legal
water connection has led to a demand pull on the City
Corporation for other services as well as demands for more
significant social change.
5.3.4. New rights. While it is not the legal responsibility of
Dhaka City Corporation to supply services to slum/squat
dwellers, major gains have
been made in access through
NGO intermediaries. For ex-
ample, one NGO, Dusthya
Shathya Kendra (DSK), has
been working in slums to
smooth the process for
utility approval of legal, safe
water connections. However,
such examples are patchy
and have not resulted in a
formal recognition of rights
to water. In all aspects of
service delivery there is a
dominance of e´lite (so-
called VIP) interests. Service
provision and repair
activities are influenced by
politicians, who may make
complaints or special
requests on behalf of
residents, which may
benefit the slum dwellers at election time.
5.3.5. Improved access. Service providers are inaccessible, users
are disempowered, bureaucracy is mystified and staff have little
knowledge of the problems faced by users or little empathy
with them. There is limited access to systems of help in
accessing services or complaint systems to deal with problems;
service providers are not geared towards those most in need.
Offices are confusing: there is no reception/help desk for
providing assistance to users, and similarly no signs or notice-
boards. There is a significant vulnerability of users in inter-
action with agencies.
5.3.6. Improved accountability in functioning. Service providers
are typically seen as remote, impersonal and inefficient.
Accountability of service providers is typically bought through
pervasive corruption26: civic and political rights are not
acknowledged and entitlements are not met. The poor and slum
dwellers typically have weak capabilities to demand better
services and instead rely on patron–client relations or organised
civil society. Political processes are weak, as are constitutional
checks and balances as well as the rule of law. The Press helps
disseminate information and, together with anti-corruption
groups, exerts pressure to improve services. Centralisation of
service delivery has created long delays and a lack of
accountability and a user perspective in service delivery. Issues
of citizenship and rights are unimportant and user alliances
with key actors are important for those who are unable to
represent themselves.
5.3.7. Information dissemination. Local zonal offices together
with ward commissioners are intended to bring service delivery
to the local level and reduce social barriers to access; however,
limited information is available to users about services.
Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs), set up by the local
Transparency International chapter, are self-help groups of
individuals working to combat corruption in their localities;
they collect and disseminate information on local priorities.
CCCs are also involved in corruption surveys, rating municipal
services and lobbying for change.
Sector Ethics
Local government . Instances of officials with a social conscience
. Inability to meet responsibilities through lack of resources
. Responsiveness to powerful (money or influence)
. Discrimination against certain citizens
Central government . Rated as the most corrupt country by Transparency International
index
Private sector . Profit motive
Voluntary sector . Solidarity with slum dwellers
. Raising consciousness of slum dwellers
. Creation of more equitable society, equality of opportunity and access
to servicessocial justice
Users . Civil resistance to meet collective needs
. Service delivery as disempowering, no information, access, frustration,
protest, defeat
. Accountability for services from local politicians
. Extra payments for better services
Table 3. Key features of Bangladesh scenario
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5.3.8. Staff working conditions. Service delivery in Dhaka is
limited by: employee discretion and intimidation; centralised
rules and control as well as lack of other resources; lack of
staff skills and IT; inadequate equipment; lack of supportive
procedures; poor supervision, management and remuneration;
lack of motivation and commitment; responsibilities not
matched by financial rewards for front-line staff. There is
anecdotal evidence of a market for desirable jobs; for example,
meter reading is popular because of the high bribe-generating
potential.
5.3.9. Unintended impacts. The frustration of some residents
has occasionally led to threats to service providers, for example
kidnaps or violent protests. NGO involvement created increased
demand for new services or for different sorts of services and
for more of existing services, giving power and influence to
consumers.
6. GENERAL FINDINGS
The general findings of this study can be summarised as
follows.
(a) Internationally, there has been a change of ethics in
municipal service provision from serving the public interest
to promotion of privatisation, liberalisation, and competi-
tion. However, government still has a role in ensuring
accountable delivery of urban services. The case studies
reveal the role of central government in driving initiatives
in expanding accountability and ensuring access and the
adequate performance of services.
(b) Local service providers are being made more answerable to
locally elected people’s representatives as well as to the
users themselves within a limited geographical area.
Face-to-face interaction with users on a daily basis
changes the attitude of those on the front line, developing
workers’ pride and motivation in maintaining adequate
services.
(c) Involving services users is a new mechanism for increased
monitoring of technical staff. User involvement in decision
making and community vigilance in monitoring services is
said to result in more efficient, accountable and transparent
service delivery. However, residents do not always have the
capacity for monitoring; community involvement may in
fact be transferring responsibility.
(d ) People with more power, skills, information and resources
seem better able to use the tools aimed at creating social
justice for their own ends, further buttressing their
privileged position.
(e) Accountability can be achieved through oversight bodies
(audit of public accounts, ombudsmen, anti-corruption
agency, parliamentary committees and legal reform);
agency reforms (personnel management, detection and
measurement, oversight; job requirements, salaries, objec-
tives, incentives, performance audit, and training); enhan-
cing transparency and information levels (open budgets,
freedom of information, service notice-boards, transpar-
ency, disclosure by officials; surveys, report cards, diag-
nostic studies, direct monitoring by citizen advocacy
groups).
( f ) Instituting accountability mechanisms is becoming a
technocratic activity, a means of ensuring agreed tasks are
carried out according to agreed performance standards.
This reduces the opportunity for citizens to seek account-
ability by articulating demands in mainstream political
discourse, as well as reducing the level of discretion
afforded to ground-level workers, meaning that personal
ethics are less relevant to achieving accountability.
(g) Public pressure helps make government accountable and
enhances service performance. Government has a central
role in fostering transparency and accountability in the
delivery of services. In interviews, when asked whom users
of services hold ultimately accountable, the clear majority
replied the government, even when the services in question
were outside their jurisdiction. This highlights the impor-
tance of the quality of local democracy in safeguarding
entitlements to services.
(h) Making urban services more accountable is not a process of
realising an abstract principle or applying a universal
prescription, so much as one of locally constructing what
accountability means in a particular context.
(i ) Sometimes accountability is a one-shot affair, critically
dependent on the role of a few individuals. Accountability
is not achieved once and for all but takes place on a
piecemeal basis, evolving from the needs and experience of
context.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The overall aim of this paper has been to assess the role of
ethics and accountability in the provision of urban services. A
brief review of existing literature was used to consider
contemporary innovations in the way municipal services are
delivered as well as to define accountability. Following this,
research from the UK, South Africa and Bangladesh was
presented. The potential of accountability arrangements to
improve the quality and responsiveness of local services has
been discussed with reference to general findings from these
case studies.
The provision of urban services can be viewed as the fulfilment
of an ethical ideal: for example, no one should be disadvan-
taged by where they live in the UK; or that everyone should
have access to water, sanitation, and electricity in South Africa.
Other ethics operationalised in the context of effective service
delivery in the case studies include social solidarity, responsi-
bility, responsiveness, non-arbitrary decision making, transpar-
ent resource allocation, trust, quality, democratic participation,
social equity and environmental protection. These ethics stand
in contrast with current municipal service delivery in Dhaka.
The case studies demonstrate how, in order to be made
effective, ethics are often translated into more tangible rights or
guarantees of performance. The mechanisms illustrated in the
case studies for improving accountability include: meeting
central and local government targets and policy directives;
indicator-based systems of performance assessment; reliance on
quantitative measurements (such as user surveys, report cards,
audits, objectives and so on); the creation of open democratic
structures; promotion of dialogue between providers and users;
and shortening lines of communication.
Initial findings from case studies undertaken in South Africa,
Bangladesh and the UK have been used to assess the function of
ethics as an input to systems of accountability. Paradoxically,
while these arrangements make it feasible for service users to
enforce standards and check service providers’ action, it also
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means that accountability as an ethic is reduced to a
quantifiable, ‘best practice’ management tool for universal
application. Internationally, there is a pressure on local service
providers to demonstrate accountability and a new generalised
approach for solving accountability problems has developed,
which emphasises a set of generic tools and approaches rather
than a critical reflection on an understanding of the determi-
nants of lack of accountability in that context. As currently
practised, therefore, accountability is not automatically an issue
of personal ethics.* The case studies illustrate the danger of
divorcing accountability from its historical, political, cultural
and economic context. For people to effectively articulate the
demand for an accountable government and performance-
oriented services, they require a socio-political environment
that facilitates the capacity to act and ability to get a
response—that is, access to information, effective oversight
systems, credible sanctions, clear responsibilities, independent
media, political consciousness, social awareness of rights,
political history, the role of parliament, independent judiciary,
neutral civil servants, rule of law, decentralisation, political
will, civic pressure groups and so forth.
Furthermore, the case studies reveal that overly formalising
the mechanisms can be detrimental where other mechanisms
may be more important in shaping service delivery. Service
users, for example in low-income communities, may prefer to
resolve their problems through the ad hoc use of face-to-face
contact in the streets outside public meetings, formal organisa-
tions and offices. This finding suggests that there is potential to
renew the role of shared ethics in service delivery: on the
supply side the desire and ability to be responsive to all service
users and to provide efficient and effective services; but also on
the demand side for users to overcome apathy and indifference
to service provision and exert direct pressure on service
providers, while also reconnecting service delivery to local
democracy.
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